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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JACK H. PITTS and SANDRA J.
PITTS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 15010

vs.
KIMBERLY B. McLACHLAN and
CRAIG McLACHLAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from Order of District Judge, Honorable
Marcellus K. Snow, denying plaintiff's Motion for Relief
under Rule 60 (b) (7).
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs obtained a Summary Judgment against the
defendants on May 6, 1976, for the balance of principal plus
interest, attorneys' fees, taxes and costs upon a real estate
contract attached to the Amended Complaint (R. 22), which
Judgment recites that the defendants did not appear.

Writ

of Execution issued October 15, 1976 (R. 29), and a sale was
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made to the plaintiffs on November 16, 1976 (R. 32).

Plaintiffs

on December 6, 1976, filed a Motion for Relief from Summary
Judgment under Rule 60(b) (7) setting forth that the defendant
Craig McLachlan was a substantial judgment debtor; that the
buyer under the Uniform Real Estate Contract was Kimberly B.
McLachlan and asking that the Summary Judgment be amended to
show Kimberly B. McLachlan as the person to whom title passed
by reason of the judgment and Craig McLachlan as surety (R. 33-34),
A proposed Amended Summary Judgment was attached to the Motion
and it is admitted that this was inadvertently signed by the
Court (R. 46).

Contradictory minute entries were made (R. 47

and 48) and it is admitted that the minute entry at R. 47 was
made inadvertently.

The ruling of the Court is contained in

the Order Denying Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment signed
January 18, 19 77 (R. 49) •

It is from this Order Denying Relief

that the appeal was taken (R. 51) .
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
By this appeal plaintiffs-appellants ask this Court
to rule that the District Court's Order Denying Relief was
made and entered wrongfully, both because the Motion was properly
filed under subdivision (7) of Rule 60 (b) and because the Court
did have before it a subject matter upon which to act, namely
the Judgment of May 6, 1976, despite the fact of an execution
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The District Court should be directed either to grant

the Motion or reconsider it under subdivision 60(b) (7).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the threshold appellants ask this Court to ignore
portions of the file transmitted by the Clerk of the District
court, not included in the Designation of Contents of Record
on Appeal and not properly before the District Court at the
time of the hearing on the Motion for Relief on December 15,
1976.

These documents are:
1.

The Execution issued May 14, 1976 (R. 23).

2.

The Sheriff's notice of May 19, 1976 (R. 24).

3.

The publication of notice by the Sheriff of

June 7, 1976 (R. 25).
~R.

4.

The cancellation of the Sheriff's sale

26).

5.

The Execution of September 24, 1976 (R. 27).

6.

Another copy of the Sheriff's notice of May 19,

1976 (R. 28).
7.

A letter from David M. Bown to Judge Snow dated

December 16, 1976 (R. 38).

B.

Agreement for cancellation of Execution Sale of

June 14, 1976 (R. 39-42).
9.

Additional copy of Uniform Real Estate Contract

(R. 43-44).
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any of the foregoing documents.
The parties entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract
on October 7, 1975 reciting the plaintiffs as Seller and Kimber!
B. McLachlan as Buyer (R. 4), with a provision in Paragraph 19
that
"The Seller on receiving the payments herein
reserved to be paid at the time and in the
manner above mentioned agrees to execute and
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and
sufficient warranty deed * * *
At the end of the contract Kimberly B. McLachlan signed and
below that was the signature admitted to be Craig McLachlan
and below the second signature was the word "Buyer".
The Amended Complaint alleges that defendants made
certain payments and that on the due date of the balance,
January 8, 1976, the balance owing was $29,333.57 plus taxes
and interest (R. 9).

The Answer was a general denial (R. 11).

On April 15, 1976, plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment supported by an Affidavit setting forth
the balances owing, the taxes and raising an issue as to
payment of attorneys' fees, to be reserved or resolved by
the parties (R. 13 and 15).

The Summary Judgment reflects

agreement between the parties on the matter of attorneys'
fees and withholding of entry of the Judgment for a week
and is dated May 6, 1976 (R. 22).

This Judgment recites
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"That the plaintiffs have judgment against the
defendants jointly and severally in the amount
of $29,333.57 principal* * *."
The Sheriff's Certificate of Execution Sale discloses
that the price bid by the plaintiffs included all of the
principal of the Judgment plus interest and also two items
of $250 and $750, which are not explained (R. 32).

Plaintiffs-

Appellants admit that the full amount of the Judgment was bid
for the property.
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Relief from the
form of the Summary Judgment, pointing out that Craig McLachlan
had many judgment creditors, one of whom had commenced an action
upon the theory that the entry of the Summary Judgment as above
described passed title to the real estate involved in the
Uniform Real Estate Contract to both of the defendants and not
just to Kimberly B. McLachlan.

This Motion also alleges that

the result of the requested action would give the defendants
additional time to pay for the property, would avoid a windfall
to the judgment creditors of Craig McLachlan "at the expense of
plaintiffs" and that correction of the Judgment would perform
the contract "in the manner contemplated by the contract and
the parties at the time the contract was entered into."

Attached

to the Motion for Relief was a form of Amended Summary Judgment,
which was inadvertently signed (R. 46).

The proposed relief
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"* * * against the defendant Kimberly B. McLachlan
as purchaser under the Uniform Real Estate Contract
and the defendant Craig McLachlan as unsecured
guarantor of the said Real Estate Contract * * * "
This Motion was argued before the District Judge on December 15,
1976, with appearances by Richard Bird, David Bown and Stephen
McCaughey (R. 45) and taken under advisement by the Court.
Conflicting minute entries were made as to disposition of the
matter on December 28, 1976 (R. 47-48), and on January 18,1977
the Court signed an Order Denying the Motion of plaintiffs

" * * * for the reasons that the basis for the
motion apparently falls under Subparagraph (1)
and is not timely and for the further reason
that the judgment has been satisfied and is no
longer subject to the action of this Court."
(R. 49)
Appellants urge the following issues before this Court:
1.

Rule 60(b) (1) is not the exclusive remedy where

inadvertence is one factor.
2.

The execution sale did not preclude relief to

plaintiffs.
3.

Subdivision (7) of Rule 60(b) should be applied

to plaintiffs' motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RULE 60(b) (1) IS NOT THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
WHERE INADVERTENCE IS ONE FACTOR
The Motion for Relief which plaintiffs filed (R. 33)
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admits inadvertency by alleging in Paragraph 2:
"Plaintiffs were not aware of the existence of
judgment creditors of Craig McLachlan * * * "
Inadvertence is here used broadly, there appearing to be no
value in distinguishing between "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect" as set out in subdivision (1).
The Motion for Relief also alleges the filing of an
action by a judgment creditor of Craig McLachlan, that modifying
the summary Judgment would give defendants additional time in
which to perform the contract, that amending the Summary Judgment
would avoid a windfall to the defendants and the judgment
creditors of Craig McLachlan at the expense of plaintiffs,
and would give performance of the contract in the manner
contemplated by the parties.

Plaintiffs submit that these

are reasons independent, or partly independent of the
"inadvertence" in not discovering the judgment creditors
of Craig McLachlan (R. 35 and 36).
The introductory language to Rule 60(b) requires a
liberal construction:
"Upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party
or his legal representative* * *."
A liberal construction would mean that courts would not endeavor
to place reasons under the restrictions of subdivisions (1),
(2)

and (3) , but would incline to place the reasons under sub-

division (7)

(subdivision (6) in the Federal Rules) so as to
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avoid the time limitation.

The time limitation from the first

subdivisions are one (1) year under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and three (3) months under the Utah Rule, thus exertlng
·
additional pressure for a liberal construction to afford relief

in the interests of justice.
The question of broad or narrow interpretation of
Federal Rule 60(b) (6) was the subject of an annotation in 61
Yale Law Journal starting at page 76, entitled "Federal Rule
60 (b): Relief from Civil Judgments.

11

Starting at page 82, the

annotator draws these conclusions:
"But the Court's principle that 60(b) (6) and
other.clauses of 60(b) are mutually exclusive
has not been adhered to in practice. Court
interpretations of the excusable neglect provisions in 60(b) (1) have been so broad that,
when read together with 60(b) (2) through (5),
apparently few fact situations remain to call
60(b) (6) into play. Nevertheless, courts
immediately resorted to 60(b) (6) as a mandate
'to accomplish justice.'
In many situations
they ignored entirely the mutual exclusiveness
of 60(b) (6) and other clauses of 60(b). On
other occasions, even where the principle was
announced, it was given only lip service. Consequently, almost every grant of relief under
60(b) (6) could have fallen under 60(b) (1) or
other clauses of 60(b).
"The effect of the cases under 60(b) (6) establishes
the clause as a way of circumventing the one
year time limit in 60 (b) (1), (2), and (3). 11
In United States v. Karahalias,

(2nd Cir. 1953), 205

F. 2d 331, the defendant brought a motion for relief under Rule
60(b) claiming that the illness of his wife and his inability
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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from taking this step earlier.

Judge Learned Hand discussed

the relationship of subdivisions (1) ,

(2) and (3) to subdivision

(6) and said:
"We think that it was meant to provide for
situations of extreme hardship, not only
those, if there be any, that subsections
(1), (2) and (3) do not cover, but those
that they do.
In short--to put it quite
baldly--we read the subsection as giving
the court a discretionary dispensing power
over the limitation imposed by the Rule
itself on subsections (1), (2) and (3)
* * * . " (Page 333)
On rehearing it was pointed out that the United States Supreme
Court had applied the Rule more strictly and so Judge Hand
changed the classification of the conduct from "excusable
neglect" to other reasons as covered by subdivision (6) but
still granted the relief.
In Civil Procedure Cases and Materials by Cound,
Friendenthal and Miller at page 918, this summary comment is
made:

"The proper scope of Rule 60(b) (6) has been
the subject of considerable litigation.
It
frequently has been held that the Rule must
have been intended to cover only matters outside the scope of Rules 60 (b) (1) to (5).
[Cases cited]
Otherwise the specific time
limits on motions under Rule 60(b) (1), (2)
and (3) would be meaningless.
But it is the
existence of these very limits that have
pressured many courts, in the interests of
justice, to find that errors ostensibly falling
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so special that they come within Rule 60(b) (6)
and hence are not subject to a specific time
limitation."
This Court has also found the need to interpret Rule
60 (b) in a manner which promotes justice.

In Ney v. Harrison,

5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956), a default judgment was
entered when the defendant failed to answer a Complaint and
eleven months later she made application for relief, which was
granted by the District Court.

On appeal one of the questions

raised was whether that defendant had been properly relieved
of the default.

This Court reviewed Rule 6 0 (b) and noted that

because eleven months had elapsed before the default was set
aside, the only basis for the relief would be subdivision (7),
although her affidavit alleged that she had mistakenly believed
that she was protected against personal liability by a divorce
decree.

This Court adverted to the policy of the courts to

permit trials on the merits as .against defaults and then made
this comment at page 220:
"The trial court could well regard this as among
the class of cases that Rule 60(b) (7) was intended
to govern and to permit Alda to justify her failure
to answer on the ground that the divorce decree
required her husband to bear the obligation and
required him to defend the action for her."
Ney was considered by this Court again in Kessimakis
v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976).

A default judgment
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-11had been entered in a divorce action and after five and twothirds months the defendant moved to set it aside for fraud
and the District Court held that the motion was not in time
ooder subdivision (3).

This Court affirmed the refusal of the

District Court to set the default aside, found that the
appellant had other remedies available, and then reviewed
the

~

case, in contemplation of the dissenting opinion in

Kessimakis, and observed that even though the Ney case was
decided "upon a basis not urged in the trial of the case, that
is no reason to overrule it here. "

This seems to leave the

law in Utah available for relief to promote justice, even
though the strict time limits have passed under the first three
s~divisions,

and free to impose the time limits where justice

does not require relief.

Relief was granted by this·approach

in Bros Incorporated v. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594 at 609;
Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 at 235 (App. D.C. 1964);
~

v. Schiek's Inc., 145 N.W.2d 548 at 552 (Minn. 1966).
In the instant case, the plaintiffs sold their home

~der

contract requiring in effect that it be paid for some

four months later.

It is plain from the record that

the

defendants have not paid for the house and that all the
plaintiffs wanted was to get their home back and so the full
amount of their judgment was bid at execution sale.

If, by

reason of the Summary Judgment the title in the home passed to
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both defendants, subjecting a portion of it to the claims of
the creditors of Craig McLachlan, the plaintiffs would be
deprived of a portion of their property in favor of a windfall
to persons not parties to the proceedings and not purchasers in
any sense, as well as getting Craig a substantial unearned and
unjustly enriching credit on his judgments.
"In the furtherance of justice" a case is made out,
as in Ney to grant relief even though inadvertence is a factor
in appellants' predicament.
POINT II
THE EXECUTION SALE DID NOT PRECLUDE RELIEF TO PLAINTIFFS
Rule 69 (g) (2), U.R.C.P., permits a purchaser at execution sale who does not obtain the property for which he bid to
file a motion to revive the judgment.

This relief is similar

to, but not identical with, the relief being sought by the
appellants.

The effect of the Rule is that although a judgment

may have been satisfied by execution, it is not gone forever
but is dormant and may be revived.
Continental National Bank & Trust Co. v. J. H. Seely

& Sons Co., 94 Utah 357, 77 P.2d 355, 115 A.L.R. 543 (1938),
was brought under Section 104-37-38, U.C.A. (1933) and contains
a provision similar to what is now Rule 69 (g) (2).

In that case

a judgment was obtained which supported an execution sale of
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The sale

was held to be void and upon application of the plaintiff, the
judgment was revived and thereafter a transcript was obtained
and filed in Emery County upon which an execution issued and
a sale of real property was held.

The defendants moved to

set aside the sale in Emery County as being void because the
judgment had been satisfied by the original execution sale and:
"In support of such position it is argued that
'the satisfaction of the original judgment
extinguished it entirely and forever.'
Plaintiff,
on the other hand, takes the position that a
revival order made pursuant to that statute does
just as the words imply; that is, it reinstates
the original judgment in full force and effect
* * * . " (Pages 360-361)
The court held that the original judgment was revived and that
it had not been extinguished by the first execution sale.

This

Court went on to consider the writ of scire facias as affording
comparable relief and which had not been extinguished by statute
in the State of Utah and which affords similar relief, observing:
"In this State, as in most of the states which
have adopted reformed Codes of Civil Procedure,
the objects sought by scire facias may generally
be accomplished by some other remedy." (Page 366)
The annotation which follows continental v. Seely at
115 A.L.R. 549, finds this statute to be not unusual and "being
of a remedial nature, should receive a liberal construction."
(Page 550)

And citing a Tennessee case at page 553, states:
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"Likewise, under the Tennessee statute, it is
held that the fact that the purchaser is also
the plaintiff in the execution makes no difference
with respect to his statutory right to have the
judgment revived, so long as his conduct is not
such as to repel him from the court."
A comparable analysis of the law on failure of title
of an execution purchaser is contained in Section 1038 of 47
Arn.Jur.2d.
The language of Rule 69(g) {2) does not quite fit
appellants' position in this case, but this Rule offers relief
comparable to the relief which appellants seek; thus bearing
out not only the persistence of the judgment against the claim
of extinction but supporting the general equitable principle
that a purchaser at execution sale who is disappointed in the
result and finds his expected purchase in part diminished may
have relief.

This is a strong evidence of "another reason"

justifying relief under subdivision (7) of Rule 60(b).
POINT III
SUBDIVISION (7) OF RULE 60(b) SHOULD
BE APPLIED TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
Appellants subrni t that the en try of the summary Judgment
whether it be called an election of remedies, a performance of
the contract, or a payment of the price of the land, if it
accomplished the transfer of title at all transferred it to
Kimberly B. McLachlan.

There was an equity in Kimberly B.

McLachlan as the Buyer under the original contract and under
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payment of the price, the title was to go to Kimberly B.
McLachlan or her assigns.

None of the process of litigation

amounted to an assignment by Kimberly B. McLachlan; therefore,
~ything

that passed by reason of the Summary Judgment passed

to her.
Appellants have not been able to find a case precisely
in point and refer the Court to Houston Oil Co.v. Randolph,
(Tex. 1923). 251 S.W. 794, 28 A.L.R. 926.

It is there stated:

"A vendor who obtains a judgment for the unpaid
purchase money will be presumed to have received
full satisfaction of his debt thereby."
The judgment there obtained was against the principal and his
s~eties

on the note, the execution sale involving property

of the principal.

The court held that by reason of the execu-

tion sale for the unpaid purchase money, the title passed to
the principal and

not to the sureties.

The intent of the

parties is plain from the documents here involved that
Kimberly B. McLachlan was the buyer and she and her husband
both signed as performers of the contract.
On the assumption that an interest in the land passed
to Kimberly B. McLachlan only, appellants are entitled to consideration under subdivision (7) of Rule 60(b) for two reasons:
(a) to avoid multiplicity of actions, and (b) such relief is just
~d equitable and gives the defendants further time to complete
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their purchase of the property.
If appellants are wrong in taking the position that
Craig McLachlan received no interest in the property, then
relief should be granted for two additional reasons: (c) to
prevent a windfall to the creditors of Craig McLachlan, and
(d) in furtherance of justice to the appellants not to deprive
them of their asset as anticipated in the execution sale.
A.
To Avoid Multiplicity of Actions
The Motion for Relief alleges that one action has
been filed by a judgment creditor of Craig McLachlan (R. 33)
and Exhibit A attached to the Motion shows that this judgment
is for $20,045.40 and that there are five additional judgment
creditors whose claims total more than $27,762.70.

It is

plain that all of these claims would have to be litigated,
either by interpleading them in the action already filed or
by waiting until the other judgment creditors file similar
claims.

Granting the relief prayed for would eliminate these

actions, and undoubtedly eliminate the one which has already
been filed since modification of the judgment to accord wiili
the contract would undoubtedly avoid trial in the action already
filed.
Avoidance of multiplicity of actions is one of the
classic grounds for equitable relief.

27 Am.Jur.2d, Equi~
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n

46, 47 and 192.
B.
such Relief is Just and Equitable to the Defendants
It appears from the Affidavit of plaintiffs in support

of the Motion for Summary Judgment that the defendants had
made some payments on the contract, one of them dated December
15, 1975 (R. 15).

And it also appears from the Summary

Judgment itself that the attorney for the defendants had
conferred with attorney for the plaintiffs and had not
contested the motion, provided an additional week's time
was

give~

to the defendants (R. 22) •
If the Motion for Relief were granted, it would

automatically give the defendants additional timee, since
the modification of the summary Judgment would undercut the
execution sale, requiring further proceedings and giving the
defendants that addi tiona! time.
There would be further equity in favor of defendants,
in that the price of purchase would be $31,119.40 (R. 32)
instead of the original purchase price of $32,500.
It appears that equitable treatment of the other
party is contemplated by the requirements of Rule 60 (b) that
the relief be in furtherance of justice.
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c.
To Prevent a Windfall to the
Creditors of Craig McLachlan
If the interpretation of the original contract of
sale and of the Summary Judgment as entered should be that
title to the property has passed to both of the defendants,
subject to the judgment liens of the creditors of Craig
McLachlan as to his interest, there would obviously be a
substantial loss and damage to the plaintiffs with

unjust

enrichment to Craig McLachlan through being relieved of a
portion of his judgments and a windfall or unjust enrichment
to the creditors of Craig McLachlan.

27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity,

indicates that this is a ground for equitable relief.
American Employers v. Sybil Realty,

(E.D. La. 1967)

270 F.Supp. 566, 11 F.R.Serv.2d 60(b)28, case 1, involved a
motion under subdivision (5) of Federal Rule 60(b) seeking
relief because of a mistake in the date of a transaction,
which, as originally testified and applied, resulted in a
large recovery under a writ of garnishment.

The relief

sought was to correct the date and therefore eliminate from
the effectiveness of the garnishment approximately $8,000.
It was argued that the garnishee was not entitled to this
relief because subdivision (5) has language indicating that
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it can have only prospective application.

The court applied

swdivision (6) of the Federal Rule and modified the judgment
50

as to reduce the amount of judgment taken by the writ of

garnishment.

This is a parallel situation as to relief,

because the basis of the motion was a mistake but the result
of the mistake and action was a windfall and unjust enrichment.
Williams v. United States, 138 u.s. 514, 34 L.Ed.

1026, 11 S.Ct. 457, is cited in 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity,
~d

§

28,

is authority for a holding that even without the presence

in the action of the third party who holds title (in that case
the State of Nevada) in whom the title reposed by reason of
the mistake involved in the relief sought, the court can grant
equitable relief by correcting a deed, thereby divesting the
State of Nevada of the parcel of property and vesting it in
the person entitled thereto, who was the moving party.
It appears that no interest has accrued to the
judgment creditors of Craig McLachlan through the entry of
the Summary Judgment in this case and there would be no
inequity to those judgment creditors if the summary Judgment
were corrected to make plain that it is Kimberly McLachlan
and not Craig McLachlan to whom the interest was transferred.
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In Furtherance of Justice to the Appellants Not to Deprive
Them of Their Asset as Anticipated in the Execution Sale
As previously pointed out, relief is given under Rule
69(g) (2) to a purchaserr at an execution sale, including the
judgment creditor, if the property which he buys in and for
which he tentatively commits his valuable judgment is not
realized.

This is also consistent with the relief indicated

in 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser,

§

523, that in an action

by a vendor for purchase money under a real estate contract, the
judgment given should adjust equities so as to do substantial
justice.

If the defendants had resisted this action on the

merits and if all of the facts now known had been disclosed
to the trial court, it would have been the trial court's duty
under this Rule to make such judgment as would have done
justice to the positions of all parties.
An old case cited in this section of Am.Jur.2d is
Ziegler, Baker & Co.'s

Appeal, 69 Pa. 471 (1871).

There a

purchaser paid some purchase money, went into possession and
improved the property.

The vendor took a note for the unpaid

purchase money and conveyed the legal title to a third party.
The vendor obtained judgment and the property was sold at execution
sale.

In distributing the proceeds of sale, it appeared that

there was a mechanic's lien which antedated the judgment and
the holder of which made a claim.

The court held that since
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-21the judgment was a purchase money judgment, the judgment
creditor was protected against the intervening lien, and the
court observed:
"Vendors are usually regarded as the most
meritorious creditors, and it would be refining
against reason so to apply the Rule as to protect
other creditors, and cut out vendors."
The court further reasoned:
"In the present case, therefore, the judgment
of Gress for the purchase money fastened upon
the legal estate the instant he conveyed to
Thomas his vendee. The equitable and legal
titles united and merged, and Gress' security
expanded with the enlargement of his vendee's
estate. What harm was done to the mechanics'
lien creditors? They had a lien only on Thomas'
equitable estate when Gress entered his judgment.
Had they, or any other creditor, sold the equitable
interest before the legal title was added, they
would have sold subject to the vendor's purchase
money, by virtue of his retained legal title,
and the bid at the Sheriff's sale would have
been diminished to the same extent, and the
vendor could have taken nothing under his
judgment. * * * Thus, the adding of the deed
to the vendee's interest did the appellants
neither good nor harm, and certainly ought
not to work an injury to the vendor."
(Pages
473, 474)
CONCLUSION
Appellants presented to the District Court, and now
present to this Court a case involving more than inadvertence.
There are involved equitable principles of unjust enrichment,
circuity of action and multiplicity of actions, an unsolicited
windfall to third parties and serious injury to the appellants
within the meaning of Rule 69 (g) (2).

Rule 60 (b) (7) should
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-22be liberally interpreted in furtherance of justice and the
Court should not inequitably limit appellants to the three
months' period of Rule 60(b) (l).

The defendants were wrong

in arguing, and the Court was misled in the second reason
given, namely that the Court did not have power to revive
the judgment, which is plainly established by Rule 69(g)(2).
This Court could and should make the decision that
the basis for relief under subdivision (7) was made out and
instruct the trial court to grant the Motion for Relief.

Res/1.~lly :ubmi~

~o(
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RICHARD L. BIRD, JR.
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants ·
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